Why Myanmar is globally important

I’m seeing an increase in the number of articles about Myanmar in the western press these days. This piece by Conor Foley in the Guardian is one example; another is in the IHT. I haven’t been to Myanmar, and I confess to not knowing much more than I read in the news – but I have met Burmese people working here, a Singaporean nun living in Myanmar, and people who’ve been through; since I came to South-East Asia, my attitudes have changed somewhat, and I’m aware that the situation in Myanmar is much more complex than I thought when I was still in the UK.

A major influence on my thinking was an article by David Fullbrook in Asia Times, which I read in 2004 and wrote about then. It made such an impression that during my MBA, I persuaded my team in Global Risk Analysis to use Myanmar and China’s plans for the Irrawaddy as our group case study. Everybody in the team and, later, our lecturer actually found it really, really interesting, partly because it was so unexpected, but everyone was fascinated by the implications.

ATOL has recently posted a follow-up article, also by David Fullbrook, bringing the story up to date. It makes fascinating reading. It makes clear – well, ok, you have to read between the lines somewhat, but it’s not hard – why Myanmar is becoming globally significant.

Basically:

• China is making progress on its plan to open up the Irrawaddy, so that ocean-going ships can sail deep up-river into Myanmar, and reach the port of Bhamo, close to the Chinese border
• From Bhamo, China is building roads, railways, and pipelines. Oil from the Middle East, Sudan, etc, and other raw materials from Africa, can enter China that way. Manufactured goods can leave China that way.
• Combined with the new trans-Himalayan routes into India, and the new rail and road links with ASEAN countries, this means that China will finally be able to develop the West which will stem much of its internal migration, bring investment to the interior, and do much to address the income disparities that are threatening social stability.
• Myanmar is essentially a Chinese client state at this point, although it’s trying to play China off against India. Once China gets this project operating – and it seems to have made much progress over the last couple of years – it will have a secure sea route to Europe, the Middle East and Africa – one that is protected by its own military power, and is nowhere near as vulnerable as the Straits of Malacca, which has piracy problems and would be easy for the US Navy (for example) to shut down during some hypothetical future confrontation. Having a shorter, more secure, sea route for essential imports and exports is of unbelievable strategic importance to China.
• On that note, if China switched the bulk of its shipping to the Irawaddy, and didn’t need the Straits of Malacca any more, who would be left vulnerable? Singapore, a significant regional ally for the US, where the economy could be badly hit. Oh, and Japan and Korea, who would still have to ship pretty much all of their oil via that route. Oh, and I suppose Taiwan, as well. Hmmm. I guess that Shinzo Abe does need to make nice with China, Momus‘ worries notwithstanding.

So, just to summarize: China is just a couple of years away from creating a new sea route that will increase the internal legitimacy of its government, provide an economic boost to its most deprived regions, leave it much more strategically secure, and strengthen its strategic position vis-a-vis its regional rivals, whilst strengthening its ties to regional partners up to and maybe including India. The West of course, having nailed its colours to the mast regarding sanctions and the isolation of Myanmar, doesn’t have a great deal of anything it can do about this. I suspect that’s why the US has suddenly bumped Myanmar up to the Security Council’s agenda.